بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم، والحمد لله والصلاة والسلام على رسول الله، أما بعد

This is the third article in a series I am devoting to explain the faults of the western Salafi da`wah. I write these as having been one who lived eating and drinking Salafiyyah for a period long enough to be familiar with their positions and justifications.

And like the rest of this series, on a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being a full an incoherent rant, while 10 being an academic article without a single sentence missing a citation, this article is probably a 3.5, admittedly. As mentioned from the first article, most ex-Salafis couldn’t give the time of day to making any attempt to rescue those still brainwashed by the cult. I’m not only discussing certain issues, but the story of how I “came around” with each one.

Also, I am grateful to hear from those who reached out to me via private channels, who told me about their experiences with Salafiyyah and subsequent return to mainstream Islam and seeking knowledge properly. Please leave a comment and let others know that they are not alone.

I delayed the writing and publication of this installment, because before I even started, a fitnah arose between two personalities associated with Salafiyyah (one of whom I know personally and love very much), and some of these particular political issues. There was name calling, taking sides, refutation videos, memes, etc. I felt it would be bad timing to suddenly release an article as if I was weighing in and inadvertently be drawn into the fray, which is the last thing I want, although it may happen eventually.

From a sideline view, and in other chat groups I was in, all that debate was dismissed. Not evening weighing in. Just “oh look, they’re fighting again.” I believe it is assumed among fuqaha that our legacy and tradition is very rich and diverse. That diversity of precedents can sometimes be a fitnah. People may pick and choose according to their hawa, not according to consistently applied principles. But it is the knowledge of those principles and ability to apply them properly that distinguishes true scholars.

But what happens when one opinion is chosen, and propagated as being “the Sunnah” and other opinions and precedents are ignored, and other opinions, even from the Salaf, are labeled heretical innovation?

When people find out that scholars differed, ^[1]Do you remember when Imam Malik was approached by the caliph who wished to make his Muwatta’ a constitution for the Abbasid dynasty? He said, “Maybe the people differed”!! and that the wool has been pulled over their eyes, they will naturally leave the cult, in mind if not in body. And what often happens then, is that they leave the narrowmindedness of Salafiyyah, and sometimes turn to the most openminded forms of Islam that exist – if they still follow Islam – so that they can see and appreciate all of the legacy, the principled and unprincipled, whether based on the first three generations or having come afterward.

Ask any Sufi shaykh “do you know of ex Salafis that have become Sufi” and they could probably show you dozens, if not hundreds of such stories. They may point to all their students, or show you all their e-mails.

Finding Salafis who are former Ash`ari/Maturidi is extremely hard. Finding Salafis who were formerly Sufi is usually only possible from the `awam involved in the most ignorant of practices. If Salafiyyah, in the way it is propagated and handled, were right and proper, you would expect some frequent “conversion” and it would not be so anomalous. But the da`wah has been grossly mishandled. May Allah grant us all sincerity and guide us all to what He loves and is pleased with.

Returning to the original subject…

I’ve read several books explaining the evils of terrorism and the khawarij of our times, as well as their ideological genealogy, allegedly beginning with Syed Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood, which, by extension, indicts Syed Abul Alaa al-Mawdudi’s Jamaat Islami.

Having studied in a “Salafi university” with lots of Salafi friends, I was one who often sat down with brothers at my local masjid in Peoria and explained to them what may have been said or done wrong, with the proofs from the Quran, Sunnah, words of the Salaf, and contemporary Salafi scholars.

Such conversations rarely touched on issues of tawheed and shirk, but more about the “political matters” that were trademark to the most restrictive form of the Salafi da`wah. After all, people speak more about politics than they do about Allah. Allahu musta`an.

There are many groups out there that lay claim to the label of Salafiyyah. Most western Salafis may be surprised to hear this. The unique differences of the strand followed by Western Salafis makes them often referred to as “quietist Salafis” because of their noted abstinence from political participation of any form, and their delegitimization and hereticating of most modern claimants to jihad.

Among their hallmarks that I will discuss in this article:

• Blanket prohibiting, in the strongest words, of voting and elections, as it is considered approval of a system that judges by other than what Allah revealed.
• Blanket prohibition of working with that system, as a political candidate or even forming an Islamic political party. For the same reason. They too are claimed to have fallen into shirk and kufr.
• Blanket prohibition of protesting against the government, as it is seen as a provocation of revolt which may lead to civil war and untold misery. Often times, those who engage in this are labeled as khawarij by the Salafis.
• Blanket prohibition of speaking out against the government, for the same reason, and anyone who engages in it is often given the same label: khawarij.
• Blanket prohibition of revolting or attempting forcible change of the ruling party. And they too are labeled khawarij.
• Prohibition of boycotting. This issue is more economical, but I have seen it mentioned in books with the other issues above.

 

My intention in discussing these issues is not to refute these positions–not all of them. But to show readers that most of these issues are issues of ijtihad. Or where there is a general ruling, but some flexibility that cannot be lost. Therefore, it is up to the scholars most familiar with the situations to decide the applicability of any such practices at any given time or place. Scholars differed in the past. And they can differ today. Presenting one position only as if it is Islam, and any other position as outside of Islam, is dangerous and misleading.

As for the issue of jihad first noted, this is not the subject here. I find the general stance of quietist Salafis to be fairly aligned with the Quran and Sunnah. And that is the prohibition of raising arms and committing violence without the directive of the commander in chief. This is well-known in Islam, alhamdulillah. It is up to the political leaders of the Muslim world to make such a declaration. Without that, all treaties must be respected. Defensive warfare to protect Muslim lands, as the Afghans did against the Soviet Union is a different issue altogether. Just as an American cannot go to any country and attack people claiming that it is for the good of American interests but without direction from the US. But if that country invaded the US, every citizen would have the right and duty to defend.

So, let’s look closer at the other issues…

 

The connection between these political issues and the Muslim Brotherhood al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen

 

The Salafis have a variety of nemeses. One of them is the Ikhwan. The pan-Islamic movement Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Egyptian Hasan al-Banna in the late 1920’s. al-Banna was the son of a Hanbali imam, and he sat with Sufi sheikhs but attended a secular school. He became a writer and activist, but his primary vocation was as a school teacher. He founded the Muslim Brotherhood as a community service group for adults. Owing to his passion at a time when the Muslim world was broken from the fall of the Caliphate, the movement spread quickly.

The Brotherhood did not limit themselves to community service, but all institutional development and progress. They raised money for the Palestinian revolt of 1936. When they received funding from Nazi Germany (before WW2 and the Holocaust), they were able to spread their influence greatly, and membership increased a hundred times over.

When the temptation of greater political influence appeared within reach, MB leadership became willing to play ball and change their strategy. However, al-Banna had previously spoken about jihad. Some of the MB members may have taken the message too much to heart, targeting Arab governments, even assassinating the king. The Brotherhood was banned in 1948. Al-Banna tried to reach a truce with the government, but himself was assassinated in ‘49.

The MB went underground until social critic Sayyid Qutb returned from America and they supported the coup of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser betrayed them, and Qutb was ultimately executed in 1966. The movement spread worldwide amid frequent bans. They seemed to have gotten complete victory in 2012 when member Muhammad Mursi was elected president of Egypt. He was of course overthrown, and that event was much celebrated by Salafis in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Sisi infamously massacred MB protesters and banned the movement anew. As a membership organization, they may have never been weaker. But in terms of influence, they are considered martyrs, and respected. The late great shaykh Dr Yusuf al-Qaraḍāwī, was a well-known member of the MB.

Salafi scholars have had two main criticisms of the core MB movement:

1. Unregulated pragmatism, or the “ends justify the means”. Taking any means to achieve greater “top down” political influence.
   1. The original movement vacillated in their stance towards violence as a means, but ultimately chose nonviolence. Not all members agreed. And so the MB witnessed a number of offshoots: The Shia Hezbollah; the “caliphate is the main issue” Hizbut-Tahrir (largely peaceful); Hamas of Palestine; and the violent “Takfeer and Hijrah” or jamaa`at al-muslimeen. Al-Qaedah and ISIL have also been purported offshoots. But it has also been claimed that ISIL was a marriage between extremes of MB and extremes of Salafiyyah. Allah knows best. Admittedly, I have not spent too much time studying the history.
2. Gathering all Muslim groups together, regardless of creed, saying, “let us unite upon what we agree, and excuse each other over what we differ in.” For Salafiyyah specifically, this translates to uniting with the Twelver Shia, allowing them to destabilize the Sunni world, letting them build shrines unrestricted, and reintroduce grave worship en masse.

Now on a separate note, recall the close connection between Saudi Salafiyyah, following the legacy of Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (rh) and the historic ties to the Saudi government and family. There is, thus, an inherent indebtedness to protect the honor of the Saudi government, and a strong connection between the government and the Salafi scholarly body. And like any government, righteous or even absolutely oppressive or hedonistic, that government will want to protect itself. At a time when tyrannical governments were at risk of great terror attacks, the Saudi regime found an ally among a group of scholars who not only condemned revolt and terrorism, but condemned, in the strongest terms, any remote semblance or stimulus.

But they did not find this feeling among all Salafi scholars. But today most prominent, Sh Rabee al-Madkhali, and a minority with him. Others were more nuanced or even open minded themselves, and thus, many of them lost their “Salafi manhaj card” and were refuted, discredited, and deemed “among the 72 sects” of the people of innovation. There were others who, despite their open criticism of the Saudi government, like Sh al-Albani (rh), and Sh Muqbil (rh), but perhaps because they were great scholars of hadeeth who articulated the Salafi manhaj and also critiqued the Ikhwan quite strongly, they were graciously excused by the rest of Salafi polemicists.

 

The ruling of setting up a democratic government حكم تنصيب أو إنشاء دولة تتبنّى الديموقراطية

 

There is no known or respected difference of opinion about the absolute prohibition of setting up any complete ruling system that belittles the Sharia.

Islam prohibits, in the strongest terms, any belittlement of the guidance of the Quran and Sunnah, whether that belittling is considering its guidance optional, or on par with other systems and their rulings.

What no scholar of Islam can disagree with, is that having a government where legislation is decided merely on popularity, or “majority rule” jumhuriyah without guiding principles of the Sharia, is categorically forbidden.

This is the tasweer or visualization of democracy that Islam no doubt forbids, regardless of the system. Whether it is a “rule by the people” or a representative democracy or even a kingship or even a caliphate – if the ruling decide that they are no longer going to love and uphold the Sharia.

Do note, that this does not include leaders and legislators who strive to uphold the Sharia, or do what is best without violating the Sharia, but may differ as to what that entails. To this extent, there will always be scholars who agree, and those who disagree. Those who are respectful despite their disagreement, and those who are severe.

But there are juz’iyat or particulars in modern democratic governments that need a closer look, if only to simplify.

What if a democratically elected government claims to uphold the Quran and Sunnah in its constitution and makes its lawmakers pledge to follow such? What if they have a Sharia court with jurists who review any laws that are passed before they can be implemented, or at least available for appeals to challenge laws that may border on injustice? Consider the “himariyah” issue of inheritance in Umar’s time as an example of an appeal.

On one hand, having a simple group of representatives that common people can trust to voice their concerns and secure their rights is part and parcel to the spirit of Islam. Consider how Umar ibn al-Khattaab took his governors to account and made sure they were accessible to the people, and how fearful he was of shorting anyone of their rights. The governors were essentially representatives of the executive caliph. There was even a time when Umar took a vote of the people of Iraq that were in front of him to decide their own governor.

Consider also the role of his shura that he would gather for consultations. Many times he would work to persuade them to his side when difference occurred, and sometimes a consensus would be created among them.

And consider when Umar appointed the shura of six to choose the next caliph from among themselves. And AbdulRahman ibn `Awf then surveyed the people of Medinah. He did not even limit himself to men or scholars only. No one protested what he did.

Even greater than that, Ali ibn Abi Talib left it up to the people to decide their next leader when he was assassinated, opting not to give any direction whatsoever in his final breaths. Allah be pleased with them all.

The point of these anecdotes is that some parallels can be drawn, between the prophetic caliphate, and more complex modern systems. Indeed, during the time of the Umayyads, much of the Byzantine system was simply acknowledged in place, and then Arabized. The Abbasids did similar, except theirs was more Persianized. And from each of those eras are rulers whom some have referred as being among the “rightly guided caliphs” like Umar ibn Abd al-Azeez and Nur al-Din Zenki.

 

The ruling of voting [التصويت] in elections [الانتخابات]

 

Allah has forbidden the consumption of swine and the use of any pork products. Deeming any of it halal is apostasy. However, Allah has allowed, indeed prescribed its consumption for the one in dire necessity and no other options.

This is not the person who is on the brink of death. Because if you literally wait for the brink of death, and then eat a pork chop, you will die, because of “refeeding syndrome” and imbalanced electrolytes. And this phenomenon has been documented and observed many times from people who have been starved due to great wars and famines suddenly treated to a feast of food that would prove to be their last. But rather, this dispensation is to stave off the brink of death.

Now let’s imagine you are in the position – may Allah protect us all. There is nothing around you except pork products.

Can you then choose which pork product to keep yourself functional? Can you choose between bacon and pork chops and ham? Or do you have to put it all together, put on a blind fold, toss it up in the air with your mouth open and see what falls in your mouth?

Only an idiot would say that.

Now take a look at the bacon, the sausage, the chops, the ribs and the ham. You go for the ham. It causes constipation. Next day you try the ribs. They cause diarrhea. The next days, you experiment with the others, and you find that bacon, sausage and chops do not mess with your system. In fact, you even find that, unfortunately, if you cook the ribs or the bacon just right, it can be tasty and give you more energy than the rest. And maybe that energy can help you get a way out of the mess you are in and climb over that prison wall.

What would the sensible Muslim do? Would they wallow in their state, make sure to eat only the one that will taste bad and make them sick, just so that they don’t develop a love of what Allah forbade? Or would they accept and praise Allah for the concession, and use that concession to build strength, and praise Allah for the existence of something that gives him a little bit of comfort, enjoyment and hope in his moment of general despair?

When you stand in line to vote for President, or even to vote for city councilman, all you are doing is saying “of the 3 available candidates that you presented before me, and one of them will definitely be getting into this position, I think this candidate may provide some direct or indirect greater advantage for me and those I care for than the other(s) in deen or dunya, even if they don’t represent most of my interests or beliefs. And Allah knows better.”

The election representatives then basically say, thank you, and your preference will be noted and tallied! They don’t say – “oh wait, this guy on Main Street refused to vote, therefore we will make the Sharia rule, and all these candidates have to go home.”

Imagine if the other Muslims in Axum told Ja`far ibn Abi Talib, “the Quraish ambassadors are speaking to the Negus and his court, these people are all pagans and mushriks. If you go to them and debate with them, you are acknowledging their floor and their rules and giving them power over you and us!” Imagine if they said that. And imagine if he listened. We would have a whole different seerah. Alhamdulillah Allah gave him and them `aql.

A discerning Muslim will vet who they engage in business with – Muslim or not – and who they engage in marriage with. Why wouldn’t they vet and make a choice with who decides the speed limit, zoning rules, housing development, prosecution, penalties, coroner, etc?

I honestly cannot imagine anyone who has grown up in America, and lived to their golden years, got a good head on their shoulders, and has tried various jobs in multiple sectors, especially business, or dealt with non-profit organizations, and brushed with the government from time to time, yet still be convinced that making a mark that says “I prefer this candidate over that one” is shirk.

Or would they prefer to do away with elections and have lifetime appointments!? That will really lower the incidence of oppression, corruption and cronyism, just ask the Arab countries and their decades of dictatorships!

I don’t like sarcasm, but there are some positions of our Salafi brothers that I find to be incredibly dense. But I’ll admit that I was one of them, and for several years I did not vote. However, that was a time when these positions were not well articulated, and if you researched, you only found one opinion. We accepted it and propagated it. Back in those days, Yahoo search would hardly give Muslim responses. Now, Arabic Google is Salafi, through and through. Opinions from other scholars only show up on the first results if they are from a news outlet.

 

The ruling of participating in the democratic process

 

Participating in a system that is not from the Sunnah, at first thought, seems blasphemous. But then again, just about everything we involve ourselves in with today is not from the Sunnah. That’s why everything must be broken down and analyzed at a much finer level, to see if it really contains any blatant prohibitions.

A fatwa from Islam Web states:

فإن المشاركة في الدولة عن طريق البرلمان أو الوزارة من مسائل السياسة الشرعية التي مبناها على المقارنة بين المصالح والمفاسد، فمتى غلب خيرها على شرها رجح دخولها، ومتى غلب شرها خيرها رجح تركها، ومرد هذا الأمر إلى أهل العلم في كل بلد، فإنهم أدرى بملابسات بلادهم، فالأصل أن نفع المسلمين بأي وسيلة لا تؤدي إلى الإثم أمر مشروع في الجملة، فمن كانت نيته بالدخول للبرلمان أو الوزارة خدمة المسلمين وتحصيل حقوقهم، فلا نرى مانعاً من ذلك، لأن الشريعة الإسلامية مبناها على جلب المصالح وتكميلها ودرء المفاسد وتقليلها، وترجيح خير الخيرين بتفويت أدناهما، ودفع شر الشرين باحتمال أدناهما.

Participation in the government through their parliament or cabinet ministry is from the political issues based upon comparing the benefits and harms. So whenever the benefits outweigh the harms, getting involved is better; and whenever the harms outweigh the benefits, abstention is better. And this is referred back to the people of knowledge from every land. [CC – not a small group of hadeeth scholars on the other side of the globe] Because they are more experienced with the intimate conditions of their lands. But the default is that benefiting the Muslims by any means that does not lead to sin is legislated in general. And so whoever’s intention by entering the congress/parliament or ministry is to serve Muslims and secure their rights, then we do not see any preventative of that. Because the Sharia is based upon procuring benefits and perfecting them, and repelling harms and limiting them; and preferring the best of two goods [even if by] neglecting the lesser of the two, and repelling the worst of two evils [even if by] bearing the lesser of the two.

Some of this speech may be familiar to many, to the point that it is seen as “ad nauseum” and you even see students of knowledge on the sidelines (not imams or muftis who actually face the entire Muslim community) mocking “the lesser of two evils”. But pay close attention to their words and see if they offer something better. If they do, then let’s all hop aboard, but if not, at least respect the principles of your own deen.

Much of the same can be extended to running for school board, library board, and city council. As for representatives and senators at the state and federal level in the US, I will refrain from writing or speaking about those subjects until more scholarly bodies weigh in.

 

Publicly speaking against the ruler

Speaking negatively about anyone, ruler or subject, friend or relative, is backbiting. Sometimes, that can be permitted. In a couple oft-quoted verses of poetry, the situations of permissibility are gathered:

	القدحُ ليس بغيبةٍ في ستـةٍ
Critique is not backbiting in six (cases):
متـظلمٍ ومعرِّفـٍ ومُحـذِّرِ
Oppressed and defining and warning
	ومجاهِرٍ فِسقًا ومُستفتٍ ومَنْ
And publicizer of sin, and questioner and one
طلبَ الإعانةَ في إزالةِ مُـنكرِ
Seeking help in removing a wrong.

 

Most people have layers of their persona and reputation. There may be aspects of them that are completely private and unknown to even their closest family members. What they do when they are all alone. There may be aspects known to relatives and colleagues, like their personality and habits. Then there may be aspects of their work or public persona which are available to all, or as in some professions, rated publicly.

Whether we are dealing with a scholar of the religion or a head of state or a plumber or physician or professor, the innermost details of their lives, should we happen to come upon that knowledge accidentally or even through voyeurism, the general ruling is sanctity. If it is a good act of theirs, keeping it secret preserves their sincerity. If it is an evil act, then it preserves their shame. Unless someone is scheming to destroy Islam, commit a great murder or heist, it is hard to imagine when exposing one’s private blemishes is of merit or benefit.

As for what they do and how they behave in front of their relatives, friends and close colleagues, then this is a dimension that may have limited influence on their work performance. The proverb of Imam Ahmad in this realm is that “the righteous ruler who is weak, his righteousness is for himself, his weakness hurts the Ummah; whereas the strong but sinful ruler’s sins are against himself, but his strength for the Ummah.”

I tend to agree fairly consistently with Salafi scholars on the prohibition of speaking against rulers. I don’t doubt that some speech against kings and leaders from the pulpit has nothing to do with naseeha. And I suspect it’s best to speak about dictators as much as you wish they spoke about you: nothing. I’m always amazed when people get together and talk foreign politics as if their opinions mattered.

But let’s get serious here and consider both the context of America as well as those abroad.

Speaking of the political leaders depends on the intention and on the words and manner.

If you are speaking about a private sin the leader does, then this is haraam. If you want your audience to see you as a keen political analyst, then this may also be dangerous. If you want to educate others about a bad policy so that they can go to their polls informed, then that is much safer.

When in doubt, remember that if speech is from silver, silence is golden.

Despite my preamble about backbiting and considering the person of the ruler, this issue is primarily discussed under the heading of advising the ruler or rebuking the ruler.

But first, what about the narration recorded by Ahmad, and authenticated by al-Haakim and al-Albani:

ما رواه أحمد وابن أبي عاصم وابن عدي كلهم من طريق صفوان قال: حدثني شريح بن عبيد الحضرمي قال: “جلد عياض بن غنم صاحب دارا حين فتحت، فأغلظ له هشام بن حكيم القول حتى غضب عياض، ثم مكث ليالي فأتاه هشام بن حكيم فاعتذر إليه، ثم قال هشام لعياض: ألم تسمع النبي – ﷺ – يقول: (إن من أشد الناس عذابا أشدهم عذابا في الدنيا للناس)، فقال عياض بن غنم: يا هشام قد سمعنا ما سمعت ورأينا ما رأيت، أو لم تسمع رسول – ﷺ – يقول: (من أراد أن ينصح لسلطان بأمر فلا يبد له علانية، ولكن ليأخذ بيده فيخلو به، فإن قبل منه فذاك، وإلا كان قد أدى الذي عليه). وإنك يا هشام لأنت الجريء إذ تجترئ على سلطان الله، فهلا خشيت أن يقتلك السلطان فتكون قتيل سلطان الله تبارك وتعالى؟ “.

“Whoever wishes to advise one in authority, then they should not make it open and public. But they should take him by the hand to go in seclusion. If he accepts it from him, then that [is what is desired], but if not, then he has disposed of his obligation.”

Closer studies of the narration clarify that it is weak (see the link). Although many scholars approve its meaning, even if they did not reference this narration itself. Al-Qadi `Iyad wrote (quoted in Fatḥ al-Bāri), concerning Usaamah ibn Zaid’s stance towards Uthman ibn Affaan:

بل يتلطف به، و ينصحه سراً فذلك أجدر بالقبول

Rather, he treats him kindly, subtly, and advises him privately, as that is more likely to be accepted.

However, assuming it is authentic, it would seem to be applicable for one who has access to their ruler. Even though advising the rulers in such manners of public policy matters would be the first step, if they do not change, and with so much at stake, pressure must be applied in other ways. Journalists are affective in this—if there is any semblance of freedom of the press (for better or worse), editorials and open letters from academics, retired officers or governors, etc. Especially if state workers are themselves unable to voice their concerns without discipline at best, loss of dunya at worst.

Some scholars, like ibn Uthaymeen (rh), cited many examples of companions publicly rebuking their rulers when the rulers were in front of them, within earshot at the very least, and greater fitnah is not feared. This is especially valid when the one giving advice is greatly respected and revered.

The great problem of claiming it is impermissible to speak against a ruler’s public sins or policies publicly is that it means every time a ruler violates something of the Sharia, then that part of the Sharia has to be silenced and hidden from the masses, or tiptoed around, for fear of charges of sedition or listeners putting two and two together. This leads to the end of the religion as we know it.

Another researcher compiled a variety of circumstances, each with their precedents from the Salaf, of when open rebuke was practiced and merited, if not obligated, describing each one with a slightly different issue, although it all goes back to clarifying and rebuking wrongs when necessary.

Among his introductory points is making the distinction between rebuke (الإنكار) and revolt (الخروج). They are two different words, and while the latter is usually preceded by the former, the former is rarely succeeded by the latter. So to claim they are requisite of one another (متلازمان) is simply untrue. Second, qualifying the rebuke with public or private must be weighed by the goals of the Sharia.

And more scholars have recognized and spoken about the rules and regulations of correcting and rebuking a sultan.

Even if Salafis seek to interpret those incidents or claim that they were faulty ijtihad, then they have to at least admit that it is ijtihad from one who is qualified, and that following the ijtihad of a companion is respected.

As for private “rebuke” – like when friends get together and talk politics like an old pastime – or rebuke of a ruler openly but in his absence – like speaking ill of princes and dictators with no channel to actually rectify the situation or convey the message – then this where the speakers and listeners really have to look deep into their intention and ask themselves what they could possibly gain out of it. Are they really trying to “educate” people or just score points among followers? Social media influencers need to be especially careful and busy themselves with what concerns them.

 

Is there really zero tolerance for protesting in Islam? Is this a matter of consensus?

 

It is widely believed among Salafis that any kind of political demonstrations, protests, marches, or activism is a forbidden innovation. I remember a brother telling me “CAIR they do marches” as if it were something scandalous. This view became entrenched during the Arab spring, although there are a few quotes from the Salafi scholars of the 80’s and 90’s. But the position became a hallmark of Salafi da`wah, and it was another point of difference between Salafi scholars and Ikhwani scholars, regardless of their theological agreements or differences.

The usual justification offered by Salafi scholars is that demonstrations are disorderly, include mixing, cause chaos, and inevitably lead to worse outcomes, like civil wars. There is no clear ayah or clear hadeeth or claim of old consensus that forbids such.

In Arabic, such actions are referred to as [مظاهرات] demonstrations and [اعتصامات] – occupations or sit-ins.

Using demonstrations to make political statements is not something the books of fiqh discussed. However, that does not mean the concept is without precedent. Rather it was assumed that people gathering publicly for a cause is not by itself recommended nor discouraged in any way that automatically gives it a fiqh ruling. Rather, by default affairs are by their intentions [الأمور بمقاصدها] and means or tools have the rulings of their goals [الوسائل لها أحكام المقاصد]. They are a matter where different known Sharia principles apply, for example, and do not contain other known prohibitions.

Even secret gatherings, Allah does not give a blanket condemnation or license or praise, but rather condemns some (see Mujaadilah 8) and praises others (see Nisaa’ 114). As for public gatherings, even without purpose, we have the “rules of the road”.

However, if a group of people protest Saudi Arabia or another Muslim country for what they have done or a policy they have which is in line with Islamic principles, then naturally, scholars should condemn the protest. Likewise, if protesting could feasibly lead to the outbreak of mass civil disobedience, and then national guard firing on people (because shameless dictators don’t know of anything but the hammer), or the outbreak of a civil war, then this too may also justify scholarly condemnation of protests in the strongest terms.

On the other hand, if people protest against evil and oppression, that is a righteous cause.

Think of when the Prophet ﷺ and his companions discussed reciting the Quran publicly at the Ka`bah. Abdullah ibn Mas`ood volunteered. He recited Surat al-Rahman and was beaten up because of it. The next day, he did it again! And remember when Umar first accepted Islam, he told the Prophet ﷺ that they should not be praying in secret. And so they marched in an orderly fashion, between Umar and Hamzah, to pray at the Ka`bah. Quite the demonstration! They were definitely making a statement that could have potentially caused greater unrest, but they calculated and determined it would not lead to such, and their estimation proved right.

After the Prophet’s hijrah to Medinah, people gathered in the streets to welcome him. And time and again, there were gatherings—whether planned or spontaneous.

Even after the Prophet’s death, there are many incidents of gatherings and protests. ^[2]But do keep in mind, most historical stories are not hadeeth, and so they were not preserved like that – in case someone says “this is weak”! Of course it’s weak, because the scholars who … Continue reading Once when Umar was addressing people, a man shouted back: we will not listen, nor will we obey! Umar did not immediately beat him nor condemn him, nor did any companion. Umar’s immediate response though was why. The man said because Umar gave himself two garments and the rest one. Umar then asked his son Abdullah to explain, who clarified that he gave his garment to his father. Similarly, the famous “protest” of the woman regarding Umar’s attempt at limiting the amount of mahr.

Perhaps most famous, and infamous, was the Battle of the Camel. Despite what ensued at the hands of rebels who came to spread mischief, there is no doubt that Aishah, Talha and Zubair all gathered together and publicly marched demanding qisaas for Uthman. They regretted the consequence and what happened, but we do not know that they regretted their defense of Uthman’s blood. Allah be pleased on all of them.

Contextual factors may sway the ultimate fiqh ruling. In America, for example, people actually have the freedom to assemble. It is part of the Bill of Rights. That’s not an endorsement, but simply a fact.

In America, marching for Palestine and distributing leaflets to bring awareness of Israeli oppression – for example – is not “disobeying the ruler” or “revolting against the state”.

In many cases, you can literally apply for a license to stand at a spot with a group of people for a purpose. No law enforcement or national guard will come in and attempt to stop it. Law enforcement may even come to simply keep the peace in the case of a counter protest.

Other than that, there may be news stories if journalists are invited and decide it’s worth their time and does not conflict with their greater interests.

In fact, the leaders of the protest may then have meetings with politicians, or business owners, or whichever representatives necessary to quiet the people and protect their image. That is a method by which social and political change sometimes occurs in the United States.

There are of course protests where looting and vandalism takes place, or disrobing and promiscuity, and may even be part of the program(!). In the worst of cases on American soil (and the earth belongs to Allah, He gives to whom He wills), police in riot gear may be summoned who shoot rubber bullets and tear gas grenades.

It is often the size, place, nature, and goal of the protest that will determine the response. But based on these kinds of factors, some scholars and researchers who appreciate the possibility for nuance draw up such details, as opposed to a blanket condemnation. Of course, some famous protests and causes will always be controversial, even if they are largely peaceful.

A Jordanian researcher wrote a piece Ḍawābiṭ al-Muẓāharāt: Dirāsah Fiqhiyyah (regulations of demonstrations: a juristic study). Likewise, from Islam Web, is a fair summary ruling of demonstrations, qualified by not containing prohibitions or leading to greater evils by the estimations of the experienced.

Concerning demonstrations, I have found the fatāwā of Ikhwani scholars to be more nuanced and rooted in the principles of Usool al-Fiqh (indeed, the determinants of what is our “manhaj”) than contemporary Salafi scholars that paint all demonstrations with one brush. But the most based article I have seen for the western audience is from Dr Sajid Umar.

And how many marches or gatherings are completely free of robbery and burning, but instead serve to educate people and bring awareness to an oppression or a corporate wrong? One thing that many far seeing scholars abroad have said to students from the west is: do not export Arab problems to your country. And here, we have people exporting Arab contextual fatawa to the west. But it takes great wisdom to be able to distinguish. Allahu musta`an.

We know that promiscuity and free mixing is wrong. We know that looting and theft and burning and vandalism are wrong. But if you meet a politician or a CEO as one person, you are an annoyance. If you bring light to their public wrongs and gather numbers, then you may be taken seriously. These are some of the tools we have to work with in America.

 

But revolt itself must be universally haraam, right? And anyone who engages in it or encourages it is a khariji renegade, right?

 

There are many narrations from the Prophet ﷺ that strongly forbid disobedience to the ruler, “removing a hand from obedience”, or discarding one’s pledge, on top of a command to kill anyone who calls away from the ruler to a new ruler. Some scholars qualify these narrations to a “just ruler”, as there are narrations that allow replacing the ruler, by force.

But even if some of the Salaf and scholars allowed revolt or replacing the ruler, that must only be for their apostasy, right?

The interpretation that they are still Muslim at the very least, comes from those narrations that say “as long as they are praying”. For the madhab of Ahl-Hadeeth and some of the Hanabilah, that translates to Islam. For the jumhūr, that means major sin. Keep that in mind.

 

What about for oppression, even if they are still Muslim?

 

Imam Muslim (استشهاداً) and Abu Dawud recorded with different chains leading to Ḥudhaifah from the Messenger of Allah ﷺ:

يَكُونُ بَعْدِي أَئِمَّةٌ لاَ يَهْتَدُونَ بِهُدَاىَ وَلاَ يَسْتَنُّونَ بِسُنَّتِي وَسَيَقُومُ فِيهِمْ رِجَالٌ قُلُوبُهُمْ قُلُوبُ الشَّيَاطِينِ فِي جُثْمَانِ إِنْسٍ ‏”‏ ‏.

“There will be leaders after me who will not be led by my guidance and who will not adopt my ways. There will be among them men who will have the hearts of devils in the bodies of human beings.

‏ قَالَ قُلْتُ كَيْفَ أَصْنَعُ يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ إِنْ أَدْرَكْتُ ذَلِكَ

I said: What should I do. Messenger of Allah, if I (happen) to live in that time?

قَالَ ‏”‏ تَسْمَعُ وَتُطِيعُ لِلأَمِيرِ وَإِنْ ضُرِبَ ظَهْرُكَ وَأُخِذَ مَالُكَ فَاسْمَعْ وَأَطِعْ ‏”‏

He replied: You will listen to the Amir and obey; even if your back is flogged and your wealth is snatched; you should listen and obey.”

This hadeeth seems to be open and shut for the issue. And despite some criticisms of the chain, as mentioned, there is more than one path to Hudhaifah, and so the narration appears to be strong and untouchable. Other narrations appear to give similar meaning.

Some also claim there are contradictions with other known Prophetic traditions, but it is clear that one refers to the ruler, while the other refers to common thugs.

However, because of critiques like this, and some of the actions of the Salaf, difference of opinion exists. Some scholars qualified these narrations as referring to personal wrongs against an individual, but not the wrongs which affect the entire community, as that would imply changing the religion and a general policy that goes against the deen. A few scholars of the Salaf allowed rebelling against an oppressive sinful ruler including Saeed ibn Jubair (student of ibn Abbaas killed by al-Hajjaaj), al-Sha`bi, and Imam Malik ibn Anas among others. So it is incorrect to refer to anyone who takes that opinion as a person of innovation and desires.

What about for sins, even if they are still Muslim?

A commonly cited narration that seems to limit replacing the ruler is what Bukhari recorded via Junaadah ibn Abi Umayyah and Muslim via Ubaadah ibn al-Saamit:

بَايَعَنَا عَلَى السَّمْعِ وَالطَّاعَةِ، فِي مَنْشَطِنَا وَمَكْرَهِنَا، وَعُسْرِنَا، وَيُسْرِنَا، وَأَثَرَةٍ عَلَيْنَا، وَأَنْ لاَ نُنَازِعَ الأَمْرَ أَهْلَهُ، إِلاَّ أَنْ تَرَوْا كُفْرًا بَوَاحًا، عِنْدَكُمْ مِنَ اللَّهِ فِيهِ بُرْهَانٌ‏.‏

We gave pledge to listen and obey, while energized and while lethargic, in difficulty and in ease, and preference over us, and not to remove the command from its possessor unless you see clear disbelief, among you from Allah therein is a proof.

Imam al-Nawawi wrote:

و المراد بالكفر هنا: المعاصي.

The meaning behind kufr here is sins.

I’m not sure how to reconcile what al-Nawawi says here with other known words from him, but there it is! And it may be that this interpretation comes from his madhab that the one who leaves off prayer is not an apostate but a sinner.

Al-Qāḍī `Iyāḍ wrote (quoted by al-Nawawi 12/229): “Abu Bakr ibn Mujahid claimed there was a consensus. But a few have refuted him through [citing] the uprisings of [al-Husain] and ibn Zubair and the people of Medinah against the Umayyads, and the uprising of a large number from the tabi`een and the first generations against al-Hajjaaj with ibn al-Ash`ath. And they interpret this statement, “that we do not remove the command from its possessor” to refer to just leaders. And the claim of the majority is that the uprisings against al-Hajjaaj was not due to mere fisq, but due to what he changed of the Sharia and demonstrated of disbelief.” [CC – did any of the Salaf actually claim al-Hajjaaj was a disbeliever?]

The point being, overall, some scholars say yes, it may be justified for sin and oppression. And they have the narrations and the precedents of Husain ibn Ali, Abdullah ibn Zubair, Abdullah ibn Mutee`, and all the other companions who were with them and did not call them deviants (which are all of them) even if the most senior companions remaining alive strongly disagreed with them. The position of Abdullah ibn Abbaas with ibn Zubair is well-known. And ibn Umar towards all three of those mentioned.

But the “difference of opinion” has been fixed, and there is no consensus, only different scholars giving different explanations for the precedents that exist.

 

A closer look at “Greater harm” مفسدة أعظم

When we imagine this clause, we think of great civil wars and revolutions that claim the lives of tens of thousands, and result in a loss of security where no one is safe on the streets, money becomes worthless, and people are displaced, fleeing violence. That is surely a far greater evil as opposed to being patient.

But what about other ways of correcting the ruler, or attempting to guide the ruler before it could possibly reach that stage? What about civil disobedience? Writing letters to the rulers—as some of the Salaf did, and scholars since then (Imam al-Nawawi being a famous example)? Editorials in the papers? Finding an audience with representatives? And the myriad of other ways to gather support and change minds on the ground until those in power have little choice but to listen?

And is unsheathing one’s sword a thousand miles away, and starting a charge towards the capital the only way to attempt to replace the ruler? Certainly not. Many successful coups have taken place without shedding a drop of blood. This usually happens when a powerful general arrests the head of state and puts himself in charge. Think of the exile of Abdul Hameed II, and more recently Pakistan and Egypt for sure. That is not to praise those examples, but to show that it is possible. And those examples also make us wonder, why is it that secularists and nationalists know how to do this properly but Islamists fail so spectacularly or make things worse? I think the answer is their general abstention from civil service and the army. Were the more deen-conscious to proliferate the government, then they might actually have a chance.

Boycotting the goods of countries known for hostility towards Islam and Muslims?

 

One of the books I own and treated like scripture (like Salafis are taught to do with the words of their scholars), was about the modern day khawarij and one of the appendixes of the book had several fatawa from contemporary senior scholars decrying the use of boycotting (مقاطعة). All were citing the Prophet’s collateral based transaction with a Jewish neighbor. As much as I respect those scholars, it is as if they had completely neglected – or the one(s) who cherry picked their words – completely neglected the Prophet’s economic war against the Quraish, specifically targeting their caravans.

This is just another example of Salafi authors presenting one opinion as if it were a matter of consensus, prohibiting the entertainment of any other ideas.

Wealth is a form of strength. When you deny someone access to your wealth, by refusing to buy their goods, it weakens them. They have to lower their price or sell at a loss which could put themselves out of business, and make them upset against their oppressive warring and blasphemous nation – be they China, Israel, France or anyone else. Here, Sh Al-Albani is asked about eating imported meat from Bulgaria and he prohibits it due to their slaughter of Muslims.

I even recall, when I was in Saudia, one of my teachers say they heard from Saaleh al-Luhaydan that “a practicing Muslim [ملتزم] does not buy from their enemies.” That was the first time I heard a different opinion. And like a typical Salafi, I suspected I was hanging out with the wrong crowd, and that I needed to go find some close-minded scholars and students instead.

Probably the most nuanced fatwa I have seen regarding the issue of financial boycotting is from IslamQA, which is based on many principles and general Islamic values, keeping all the evidence in mind:

والحاصل :أن من قاطع بضائع الكفار المحاربين وقصد بذلك إظهار عدم موالاتهم ، وإضعاف اقتصادهم ، فهو مثاب مأجور إن شاء الله تعالى على هذا القصد الحسن .

Conclusion: The one who boycotts the products of the kuffaar who are waging war against Islam, intending thereby to make manifest the fact that he does not like or support them, and to weaken their economy, will be rewarded in sha Allah for this good intention.

ومن تعامل معهم متمسكاً بالأصل وهو جواز التعامل مع الكفار – لاسيما بشراء ما يحتاج إليه – فلا حرج عليه إن شاء الله تعالى ، ولا يكون ذلك قدحاً في أصل الولاء والبراء في الإسلام .

Whoever deals with them on the basis of the principle that it is permissible to deal with the kuffaar – especially buying things that he needs – there is no sin on him, in sha Allaah, and that does not affect the principle of al-wala’ wa’l-bara’ (loyalty and friendship vs. disavowal and enmity) in Islam.

 

Today, I try to avoid products manufactured in occupied Palestinien territory, and products made in China or France if feasible. It’s not always easy and often requires spending a lot more – even just going from China to Taiwan or South Korea or Vietnam – but in most cases I believe it is worth it.

 

Roots of modern political hereticating

 

I will not go into the history of the Salafi movement in America. Many have treated the subject from different perspectives. Umar Lee’s insider “memoir” The Rise and Fall of the Salafi Movement in America, which is now behind a paywall was probably the best take to explain the experience of many a Salafi burnout who rode the waves during the 90’s. And Yasir Qadhi’s Criticisms, among other writings and videos. Not to mention the multitude of western academic treatments of Salafiyyah, with varying levels of accuracy. Haneef Oliver’s The Wahhabi Myth was also a good ideological supportive description that seemed to give Salafis a legitimate appearance.

However, I cannot emphasize enough, how George HW Bush’s Desert Storm influenced Salafiyyah and the Muslim world. It was the 9/11 before 9/11, setting the stage for the latter.

Repelling Saddaam Hussein from Kuwait in 1990 and preventing him from further objectives in Saudia became an urgent and pressing matter for all Saudis, but the pressure was on the rulers. Saddam’s army at that time was considered strong and battle-hardened after their war against Iran. Saddam himself promised the war of the century. Saudi national Usamah bin Laden who had finished aiding Afghans in repulsing the Russians with the help of the CIA wanted to return to KSA and help his homeland against the Iraqi autocrat. But in the face of the threats, the Saudi government sought permission from its religious scholars to seek assistance from a foreign non-Muslim army – the deadliest in the world. After all, the Arab armies failed against tiny Israel, so how would they do against Iraq? Bin Laden had guns, but Saddam had tanks! The top Saudi scholars allowed using the US army with conditions.

That decree led to great disputes among scholars. On one hand, Usamah bin Laden considered it a slap in the face and so he made takfir of the Saudi rulers and scholars and went to war against the US. But it also drew great criticism from more levelheaded academics, scholars and teachers. One was a man named Muhammad Suroor Naif Zain al-Abideen, a Syrian from Ikhwan al-Muslimeen. He lived in Saudia for some time and took on Salafiyyah himself, but because of his political positions, he is considered the founder of the “Salafi-Ikhwani” movement. Other scholars like Abdul-Rahman Abdul-Khaaliq traversed a similar path, and they are often called Surooris. Yemeni hadeeth scholar Abul-Hasan al-Ma’ribi became another one.

Not too distant from them were the “Renaissance Scholars” Safar al-Hawali, Salman al-Awdah and Nasir al-Umar – known for pushing a variety of reforms in the kingdom. All professed the same creed as Salafis, but had a more global and holistic view of the Muslim world and progressive idealistic vision for the Kingdom. That was unforgiveable.

 

Over application of the “khaariji” designation

 

The khawarij are one of the classical mega-sects of heterodox Islam. The Prophet ﷺ foretold them and the narrations about them are mutawaatir. Interestingly, the Prophet ﷺ gave a sociological description of them: young in age, foolish dreams, speaking religiously, displaying an enviable level of worship. When this group emerged, their theological traits were deeming the rest of the Muslim world as disbelievers due to their literalism with certain scriptures regarding faith and rule, ignoring their context and being ignorant of the nuance provided by other scriptures.

Several companions and even taabi`un rebelled against their rulers but the rest did not declare them in the Fire nor called them khawarij. Others may have viewed their political choices as a faulty and dangerous ijtihad or ta’weel or a sinful disobedience, but not heresy and being “among the 72 sects”.

Because the Muslim Brotherhood have a political history and some of the spirited literary writings of their early days may be interpreted as making mass takfeer of the Muslim Ummah, they have been labeled as khawarij. And thus, fighting and opposing them is justified in the minds of Salafis.

And because the Muslim Brotherhood are known for being organized, Salafis indiscriminately label anyone and everyone who is part of any Islamic organization or institute that is not from a Muslim government as being “Ikhwani”.

Muslim schools? Ikhwani. Muslim legal organizations? Ikhwani. Islamic learning institutes and most masajid? Ikhwani. Somewhere among the original founders there may have coincidentally been a member of the MB. Although there is no distinction given by Salafi scholars on how to, within an organizational charter, identify what makes an organization “Ikhwani” and what is so bad about those yet-to-be-identified clauses or structure.

This label is perhaps the most dangerous of their appellations, which could lead to real danger for the Muslim community. They view the Ikhwan, and by extension most of these organizations, as subsets of the khawarij. They play into Ted Cruz’ agenda, trying to label every Islamic organization with remote affiliation to the MB as a terrorist organization.

The real relationship between the Ikhwan and the khawarij is more like a Venn diagram, where some of the Ikhwan or their offshoots could genuinely be considered among the khawarij, but most are probably not.

 

Who has more right to the “khawarij” designation?

 

I used to think the “quietist Salafis” as they are often called, were the furthest people of earth from deserving the khaariji label. And to be perfectly honest, I still believe that they are not true khawawij who make takfeer of Muslims over sins.

However, considering how they unquestionably spend far more time refuting other Muslims, and especially duaat, one may begin to suspect.

At what length might they be willing to go to silence their interlocutors?

That suspicion becomes more grounded when one considers the efforts made by Arab Salafis to topple Muslim leaders, if they were affiliated or even labeled with the Muslim Brotherhood. Even if it meant replacing them with secular oppressors. One looks no further than Egypt to see a prime example. And other examples have surfaced since then, in Libya and Yemen.

 

Validating and defending oppressive and tyrannical rulers who may be working to destroy Islam

 

There are strong prohibitions in Islam about backbiting. And a case may be made that backbiting the rulers is more severe. There are prohibitions against revolt and revolution. But there are also prohibitions against aiding them and helping them with their oppression. Speaking positively about them, praying for their longevity, etc may fall into that category. Hence, Sufyan al-Thawri (one of the Salaf) said, “whoever prays for an oppressive ruler to remain, loves that Allah be disobeyed.” Pray for the ruler’s guidance alone if anything.

These Salafis, American and Arab alike, may also aid these oppressive rulers in a more direct fashion. By ratting out individuals who practice Islam and work good in society, so that they can be “disappeared” and tortured or executed. Why? Because of supposed affiliations to Muslim Brotherhood. Who needs informants when you have Salafis? The best they could do is to keep quiet, but to defend the oppressors and even aid them is unfounded. Oh, the rabbit hole (or lizard hole!) that they have crawled into!

When defending the ruler is seen as righteousness, and criticizing them is khurooj, it leads Salafis to become the strongest religious ideological defenders and supporters of tyranny and oppression. Where are they from the immortal words of ibn Taymiyyah, “Allah will aid a just nation, even if disbelieving, while Allah will abandon a corrupt one, even if Muslim.”

Hence, many critics describe these Salafis as being “murji’ah” with the rulers, validating their faith no matter their words or deeds, and khawarij with duaat, seeking their annihilation.

And they serve the West by dividing the Muslims, and warring on behalf of oppressors, doing the bidding of the slimiest of disbelieving politicians and governments. But don’t forget, it’s shirk to vote for or against them(!) They should remember the narration, authenticated by al-Haakim:

مَنْ أَعَانَ ظَالِماً لِيُدْحِضَ بِبَاطِلِهِ حَقّاً فَقَدْ بَرِئَتْ مِنْهُ ذِمَّةُ الله وَذِمَّةُ رَسُولِهِ

Whoever helps an oppressor so that they can remove a truth with their falsehoods, then Allah’s protection and the protection of His Messenger have nothing to do with him.

They accuse anyone who criticizes the ruler or government and their oppression – or like I mentioned, even has an orderly desk and calendar and shows up to their appointments on time – as ikhwani (and thus, khariji); and anyone who clarifies munkar (that happens to be committed by some rulers as well) with the tongue, as being khawarij. Yet they have isolated themselves (lit. خرجوا) from the rest of the Muslim community, having greater resemblance to the khawarij of old than those they accuse. And they accuse people of heresy just as the khawarij accused people of apostasy. Those they accuse desire justice. But the Salafis desire approval and compliance with oppression. They confuse the common folks to not know right from wrong, based on whether the ruler does it or not.

But perhaps most “khariji-like” and indicative of the true harshness and hair-splitting nature of their “call” is their excessive splitting among themselves. This is inevitably followed up with accusations against one another of lies and slander. They elevate some scholars and then castigate others.

Every year or two I would, out of curiosity, take a look at the Salafi websites. Every time I was amazed that the scholars that they elevated so prominently as the scholars(!!!) were now being warned against and previous posts quoting them were hard to find. If the scholars(!!!) that they elevated were so respectable and the manhaj that they follow so clear as they claim, then certainly the scholars, of all people, should at least be able to stay on that manhaj(!)

I was shocked to see Yahya al-Hajuri (Yemen) vilified (and now I guess he’s back??? and they have collective amenesia that they once removed him??), and most recently Muhammad Sa`eed Raslaan and Muhammad ibn Hadi al-Madkhali and Abdullah al-Bukhari. And some go in and out. But long before them, celebrated but then excommunicated were Faalih al-Harbi and Fawzi al-Athari. And the list goes on and on. Saalim al-Taweel (is he still on the manhaj?) made a very ominous observation, that the movement seemed to be splitting and fighting itself due to the duaa of someone they oppressed. It’s a lot more than that my friend.

If this was the real Islam, then could someone really make duaa against the proponents of real Islam like this and expect to be answered by Allah? This just shows that this group is a cult, whether they realize it or not.

But why are they splitting so much and casting each other out of the fold? Very simple: a fault in their manhaj. They make contemporary ijtihadi claims equal to what is known in the religion by necessity. For all intents and purposes, they treat Shaykh al-Albani’s “Rabee al-Madkhali is the imam of jarh and ta`deel…” as if it were an ayah of the Quran. And I’ve even seen some claim that the speakers of “al-Jarh wa al-Ta`deel” are essentially infallible. They’ve basically turned their shaykh into their own Pope — quite ironic for a group who criticizes Sufi shaykh devotion. What’s interesting is how some of them later confronted al-Albani on tape about his accusations that Sh Rabee was harsh in some of his writings.

 

Final words

 

Like a lot of Salafis, faced with this cognitive dissonance, I would walk away from hearing interpretations from great scholars and Salaf, and bury my head in the sand, waiting to forget it, and then move on. Or I might read or listen to general Salafi talks to recalibrate myself, although none of them ever addressed the doubts, but only shouted them into a corner. I imagine followers of all doubtful ideologies do something like this when confronted by what unhinges them.

 

There will yet be another [final?] part to this series, hopefully released before summer. The next will address Salafi masjid community isolationism; excessive hereticating; what it means to be “Ahl-Sunnah”; and a look into the “Sifaat debate” aqeedah wars.

والله تعالى أعلم وصلى الله على النبي وسلم